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Just as I choose a ship to sail in or a house to live in, so I choose a death
for my passage from life ... Nowhere should we indulge the soul more
than in dying .... A man's life should satisfy other people as well, his
death only himself, and whatever sort he likes best.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The scientific revolution, which began with the launching of
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1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAviORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUS-
TAINING TREATMENT 22 (1983) (quoting Seneca, Suicide, in THE STOIC PHILOS-
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Sputnik in 1957, has progressed to its next, inevitable stage. Not
only has the process of living been taken over by computers,
microprocessors, and technology, but the process of dying has also
been transformed. In 1949, 50 percent of all deaths occurred in hos-
pitals and nursing homes; by 1980, that figure increased to approxi-
mately 80 percent.2 The practice of medicine has evolved into "an
industry bigger than defense and is growing faster than com-
puters."3 What was once the domain of private physicians and
charitable hospitals is now the province of what has become a
mass of large profit-making corporations. 4
The causes of death have also changed. Influenza, pneumonia,
gastritis and tuberculosis were the leading causes of death in 1900.
All attacked their victims relatively early in life. By 1980, heart dis-
ease, cancer, and cardiovascular diseases had become the primary
threats to life.5 Not only do these diseases attack later in life, they
are also progressive in the sense that their victims often struggle
for several months--or years-before succumbing. When death fi-
nally occurs, it is usually an institutional one. Frequently, the dy-
ing patient's last glimpse of life is a blur of sterile white nurses'
and physicians' garb, beset by reflections from I.V. containers
amid the tubes that artificially connect the patient to a world of
which he is no longer a part.
In an effort to return control over the final stage of life to the
terminally ill individual, a national movement with diverse sup-
porters has gained strength and momentum. What began in 1938
as a special interest group, the Euthanasia Society of America, has
evolved into a national movement, representing a variety of reli-
gious faiths and political points of view.6 In Ohio alone, twenty-five
special interest groups are supporting legislative proposals which
advocate a right to die.7
Religious organizations have, for the most part, supported this
movement. The Lutheran and Catholic churches actively support
the right of a terminally ill patient to take pain killers which may
OPHY OF SENECA 506 (W. Norton & M. Hadas trans. 1958) [hereinafter cited as
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT].
2. Id. at 17-18.
3. The Big Business of Medicine, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 31, 1983, at 62 [hereinafter
cited as Big Business].
4. Id.
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
6. Concern For Dying, Information Pamphlet (1983) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter cited as Concern For Dying].
7. Association For Freedom to Die, Ohio Organizations Endorsing Death With
Dignity Bill (March 1983) (on file with the author).
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not only remove pain, but also shorten life.8 A 1980 Vatican decla-
ration sanctions the Living Will as the right of a competent adult.9
The Jewish community takes a slightly different approach. While
traditional Judaism sanctifies life above all else, artificial delay in
the dying process is not required. The Central Conference of
American Rabbis supports the Euthanasia Council, as evidenced
by its statement that, under special circumstances of suffering and
helplessness, "you may allow death to come."1 0
The common law has long recognized and protected the con-
cepts of human autonomy and self-determination. Implicit in this
position is the patient's right to refuse life-prolonging instrusions.
Cardozo originally articulated the idea in a 1914 battery case, stat-
ing: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the
right to determine what shall be done with his own body ....
In the past ten years, a growing number of courts have reaffirmed
this right in the context of informed consent suits based on negli-
gence principles.12 Recently, in cases dealing with medical, legal,
8. See, e.g., Lutheran Church in America, Social Statements-Death and Dying
(1982) (on file with the author).
9. PRESIDENT'S COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 1, at 306.
10. See Concern For Dying, supra note 6.
11. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
12. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) (an adult person's
right to control what is done to his own body is the "root premise" in an in-
formed consent suit) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.
3d 229, 243-44, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (1972) (physician has a duty
to disclose the risks inherent in proposed medical treatment, but the adult
patient alone has the right to decide for himself whether to undergo such
treatment; failure to so inform is negligence on the physician's part); Hamil-
ton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 380-81, 549 P.2d 1099, 1104-05 (1976) (doctor has
a duty to disclose risks inherent in medical treatment so as to facilitate an
informed decision by the patient regarding submission to such treatment;
failure to do so constitutes negligence); Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 532,
512 P.2d 539, 546 (1973) (a physician has a legal obligation to disclose risks
associated with proposed medical treatment in order that his patient may
make an informed decision whether to submit to such treatment; treatment
in the absence of such disclosure is negligent) (citing Tatro v. Lueken, 212
Kan. 606, 512 P.2d 529 (1973)); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406, 350 P.2d
1093, 1102-03 (1960) (patient should be informed of risks and alternatives so
that he can decide for himself whether to submit to or to forego proposed
medical treatment; failure of physician to inform constitutes negligence);
Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 90-91 (Me. 1974) (patient's right of self-deter-
mination requires physician to disclose the material risks associated with
proposed medical treatment; failure to do so is negligence); Wilkinson v. Ve-
sey, 110 R.L 606, 620, 295 A.2d 676, 685-86 (1972) (patient's decision to undergo
medical treatment is valid only to the extent that his physician has disclosed
the risk involved and the alternatives to the proposed treatment; if he has
not, the physician is liable for negligence); ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Medical
Center, 81 Wash. 2d 12, 24, 499 P.2d 1, 9-10 (1972) (physician has a duty to
inform his patient of the risks involved so that the patient may make an in-
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and ethical issues, state courts have also begun to safeguard the
"right to decide."13
While such decisions give legal power to patient self-determina-
tion, they require a dying patient to initiate court proceedings to
prevent or terminate intervention when consent has not been
given.14 Consequently, of the thousands of such decisions made
daily, only a handful of cases have been litigated thus far. These
opinions raise two major issues: Who should decide, and what de-
cisions are appropriate? First, there may be, and often is, a conflict
between the patient, family, and physicians about the appropriate
method of treatment. The common law makes it very clear that
the patient is in charge of the decisionmaking process.15 If the pa-
tient is incompetent, someone acting on his behalf may make treat-
ment decisions.' 6 Case law, however, continues to be very unclear
as to a dividing line between competence and incompetence.' 7 In
formed decision concerning the proposed course of treatment; failure to do so
constitutes negligence); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 281-83, 522 P.2d
852, 860 (1974) ("patient has the right to chart his own destiny, and the doctor
must supply the patient with the material facts the patient will need in order
to intelligently chart that destiny with dignity"; suit lies in negligence for fail-
ure to disclose such information), affd in part, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334
(1975); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 597-98, 207 N.W.2d 297, 312-13
(1973) (physician has a duty to warn his patient of the dangers inherent in
proposed medical treatment; failure to do so constitutes negligence). But see
Scott v. Wilson, 396 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (physician has a
legal duty to disclose to his patient the known dangers associated with pro-
posed medical treatment; proceeding in the absence of such disclosure ren-
ders the physician liable for assault and battery), affd, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.
1967). Canadian courts follow a battery rationale. The successful plaintiff
must prove that the explanation of what was to be done (including disclosure
of both the probability and severity of consequences forming an "integral fea-
ture of the nature and character of the operation") differed from what was
actually done. Sharpe, Recent Canadian Court Decisions on Consent, 117
CAN. MED. A. J. 1421, 1422 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (competent adult has a
constitutional right to discontinue extraordinary life-sustaining treatment
upon family's consent); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266 (1981) (guardian of adult incompetent is entitled to consent to termina-
tion of patient's respirator where patient, before becoming incompetent, ex-
pressed a desire not to have his life prolonged by artificial means).
14. See, e.g., Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809
(1980) (legal guardian and children of patient in permanent vegetative state
sought court order to discontinue artificial life-supports).
15. See, e.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd,
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377,-, 376 N.E.2d
1232, 1236 (1978).
16. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); In re
Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 380 Mass. 629 (1980); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d
647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738
(1983).
17. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (although the
[Vol. 63:779
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addition, it is uncertain as to who the appropriate decisionmaker
should be once incompetence is determined.18
The other major obstacle centers on the issue of the appropri-
ateness of the decision. It has become abundantly clear in the past
ten years that neither physicians nor philosophers agree on what
constitutes an "extraordinary"' 9 or "useless" 2 0 treatment, or an
"invasive technique."2 ' Likewise, physicians trained in the Hippo-
cratic tradition are often far more comfortable with medical inter-
vention than are their patients.22
Given the lack of moral and legal certainty about such matters,
it is not surprising that courts have drawn the line in different
places.23 The result is that a dying patient, even if he initiates legal
action, has no assurance that he will be able to make his wishes
known or that his wishes will be honored. Fearing not only civil24
trial judge concluded that the patient's decision to reject surgery was irra-
tional, he failed to make a "clear cut finding" that the patient lacked the "req-
uisite legal competence").
18. See e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981).
19. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 11, 355 A.2d 647, 648, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
20. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, -, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491
(1983).
21. In re Storar, 52 N.Y. 363, 373, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 270-71, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
22. "The Hippocratic Oath expresses the duty of nonmaleficence [sic] together
with the duty of beneficence: 'I will use treatment to help the sick according
to my ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them."'
T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETmcs 106 (2d ed.
1983).
Apparently, physicians justify their intervention on the theory that any
life-prolongation "helps the sick." Obviously, this ignores the patient's expe-
rience of injury when futile, and sometimes painful, treatment is adminis-
tered. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, .supra note 1, at 15-16.
23. For a case involving the removal of feeding tubes, see Barber v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (doctors' act of with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment from patient in vegetative coma was not an
unlawful failure to perform their legal duties). Cf. In re Conroy, 190 N.J.
Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 cert. granted,'95 N.J. 195, 470 A.2d 418 (1983) (since
state's interest in preserving life outweighed patient's privacy interest, re-
moval of nasogastric tube would be improper).
Blood transfusions have been another point of debate. Compare In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (reversing lower court's
denial of hospital's application to continue blood transfusions to a mentally
retarded and terminally ill adult cancer patient), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981); with In re Storar, 106 Misc. 2d 880,433 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1980) (guardian of
terminal incompetent may compel termination of blood transfusions admin-
istered solely for the purpose of extending the patient's life). See also In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981) (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting).
24. See Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 10, 426 N.E.2d 809,
1984]
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but also criminal25 liability, physicians are often reluctant to obey
even the most precisely expressed wishes of a patient.
In partial response to these problems, the constitutional right to
privacy has been used to justify the termination of life-supports for
the unconscious, critically ill patient. As early as 1928, Brandeis
spoke of the "right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."2 6 This theme
was also articulated later in Supreme Court cases involving unwar-
ranted state limitations on abortion, 27 parental authority and far-
fly integrity,28 and the decisions "to marry,. . . procreate, and...
use contraceptives." 29 The Court has not yet extended the right of
privacy to encompass a "right to die," but it could one day view
such a right as consistent with the fourteenth amendment grant of
liberty.30 State courts have already recognized a constitutional
814-15 (1980). The fear of civil liability is usually a fear of a malpractice suit,
based on the theory that a reasonably prudent doctor, under similar circum-
stances, would not fail to prolong life.
In order to establish such a conclusion, the plaintiff (usually a relative in a
wrongful death action) must offer the testimony of a physician practicing the
same specialty somewhere in the United States. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapo-
lis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975).
Although the requirement of expert testimony was initially intended as a
safeguard against unfounded suits, the recent use of a national rather than
local standard of care has greatly expanded the opportunity to prove wrong-
doing. Thus, physician-specialists often feel victimized by the possibility of
second guessing after the fact by any other specialist in the country.
When confronted with a possible clash between the malpractice standard
of care and patient autonomy protected by the doctrine of informed consent,
or right of privacy, most courts evade the issue by claiming that professional
custom recognizes the rights of dying patients. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Barber v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, -, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491-92 (1983).
25. See Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). Brandeis originally articu-
lated this idea in his classic article on the right to privacy. See Brandeis &
Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1908).
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 n.2 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410 (1981) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972), Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923), for the proposition that the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected against unwarranted state interference).
29. Id. at 434 nn. 14-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (statute denying persons with child support obligations the
right to marry absent a showing that such obligations have been met violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute prohibiting the distribution of contracep-
tives is a per se ban on contraception and, therefore, is unconstitutional
under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (statute authorizing the sterilization of "habitual criminals"
violates the equal protection clause).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). In Roe, the court noted that although
[Vol. 63:779
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foundation which could support the right to privacy for the termi-
nally 111.31 These courts have also indicated that, in the absence of
legislative direction, the judiciary should ensure the patient's right
to die with as much dignity as possible.32
Other factors accent the inadequacy of common law and consti-
tutional principles when applied to medical decisionmaking involv-
ing incompetent, terminally ill patients. For example, the cost of
caring for the terminally ill patient places an enormous financial
burden on the patient's family and health care insurer. Currently,
health care costs are increasing at an annual rate of 11 percent
with no sign of decreasing.33 Over half of all health care dollars are
spent in the declining years of life.34 In addition, the cost of legal
procedures, such as guardianships or lawsuits to protect patient or
staff legal rights, is rapidly becoming a problem. 35 The New York
court has noted that, because the health care provider's only pro-
tection is the common law doctrine of informed consent,3 6 the
court's as well as the provider's resources might be excessively
the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee a right of privacy, the Court
has consistently recognized that such a right does in fact exist under the Con-
stitution.
Initially, however, the Court could not agree on the source of privacy
rights. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Justice Douglas con-
cluded that explicit constitutional amendments created "zones of privacy" or
'penumbras," while Justices Goldberg, White and Harlan stated that the con-
cept of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment embraced the right
of privacy). Finally, in Roe, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that "[the] right of privacy [is] founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty." 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
31. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286 S.E.2d
715 (1982); Superintendent of Belchertown School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232
(1978); In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); Leach v.
Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980).
Florida has recently enacted an express constitutional provision. FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 3 (1980). This provision is discussed in John F. Kennedy Me-
morial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d. 611, 618-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
32. Id.
33. Big Business, supra note 3, at 63.
34. In 1978, health care expenditures for those persons 65 and over totaled $50
billion. On a per capita basis, those who were 65 and over spent an annual
average of $2000-three times more than the annual average of $600 spent by
those under 65. WHrrE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING, CHARTBOOK ON AGING
IN AMERICA 94 (1981).
35. One of the authors recently questioned lawyers in Kansas City about the cost
of establishing a guardianship for a family member. It was estimated that
$1,000 would be needed to cover legal and court costs in initiating such a pro-
ceeding. Id
36. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 388, 420 N.E.2d 64, 77, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 279, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
1984]
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taxed by "an increase in the institution of such proceedings, in
some instances as an anticipatory defense strategy with respect to
possible future claims from malpractice.13 7
To meet these realities of contemporary law and medicine,
state legislatures in fifteen jurisdictions have enacted statutes au-
thotizing the use of the Living Will for health care decisionmak-
ing.38 This document, written by a legally competent adult
(usually before a terminal illness or disease strikes), constitutes
an affirmative directive to medical personnel to withhold artificial
life-support systems in certain instances. 39 The person affirms his
right to die peacefully and as painlessly as possible, without futile
prolongation of life.
As an advanced directive, the Living Will is only as effective as
its specific message. Descriptive terms, such as "terminal illness,"
"extraordinary measures," or "artificial life-supports," often take
on a different meaning after tragedy strikes. Since it will often be
impossible for a person who executes a Living Will to anticipate
the precise medical and practical circumstances that influence his
dying process, the moral and legal ambiguities surrounding these
phrases hamper the effectiveness of the Living Will.40
In light of the inherent difficulty in phraseology, the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, in its
final report issued in March of 1983, recommended new legislation
as an alternative to current and proposed Living Will provisions.
In place of the specific advanced directive of the Living Will, the
Commission advocated the use of a general durable power of attor-
ney statute which would vest the decisionmaking responsibility in
a designated person. Forty-nine jurisdictions4 1 have already en-
acted legislation that grants a durable power (one not affected by
the principal's incapacity) to a specified individual to act for the
principal in accordance with the authorization granted to him in
the document. Most of this legislation is patterned after the 1979
Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act 42 and appears to adopt the
37. Id. at 389, 420 N.E.2d at 77-78, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 279-80 (Jones, J., dissenting in
part).
38. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 318-387, where the text
of the first fifteen statutes are reprinted. Seven jurisdictions have since
passed similar legislation. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 84-58 (West 1984); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-32 (1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110.5, § 701 (Smith-Hurd 1984); W. VA.
CODE § 18-30-1 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154 (West 1984); Wyo. Stat. § 33-26-144
(1984); 1984 Miss. Ann. 365.
39. Id. at 139.
40. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
41. Only the District of Columbia lacks a general durable power of attorney
statute.
42. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 391-92.
[Vol. 63:779
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durable power concept as used in property transactions. Its poten-
tial for extending the authority of the attorney-in-fact to include
health care decisions has not yet been tested by the courts.43
A few states have specifically added limited health care deci-
sionmaking authority for the attorney-in-fact. 44 California's stat-
ute is the most extensive. Its 1983 Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Decisions Act45 permits competent adult citizens to
draft a power of attorney document in which an attorney-in-fact for
health care decisions is specifically mandated. In addition, this
legislation defines when, and under what conditions, the principal
may authorize an attorney-in-fact to act as his proxy. It also limits
the agent's decisionmaking power and specifies the extent of the
immunity granted health care providers in carrying out the direc-
tives of the attorney-in-fact.4 6
This Article will examine the mechanics of Living Will and du-
rable power of attorney legislation. It will analyze their relative
strengths and weaknesses as well as their potential usefulness to
the terminally ill patient. Because the California statute repre-
sents the latest approach to advance directive decisionmaking, it
will be examined in detail. Used exclusive of, or in tandem with,
the Living Will, the California durable power of attorney has the
potential for becoming a powerful tool for those who struggle to
retain control over the circumstances surrounding their inevitable
death.
I. THE LIVING WILL AS A LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE
The term "Living Will" was first used in 1967 by Dr. Louis Kut-
ner to describe a document drafted by a competent adult as an ad-
vance directive to his physicians or family. Usually the document
provides that no extraordinary artificial life-support systems may
be used to prolong the drafter's life or suffering in the event of a
terminal illness or injury which would render him incapable of ex-
pressing his wishes.
The Karen Ann Quinlan case 47 provided the impetus for the
43. Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 Col. L.
Rev. 985, 986 n.9 (1984).
44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5603(h) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:1 to 8:13 (Supp. 1983).
45. See infra note 86.
46. See infra notes 87-123 and accompanying text.
47. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). This
case involved a 21-year-old girl who had suffered permanent and extensive
brain damage. The patient remained in a coma for several months with little
or no possibility of recovery. The trial court judge refused her parents' peti-
tion to disconnect the respirator but commented that his decision might have
been different if Karen had executed a Living Will. On appeal, the New
1984]
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passage in 1976 of the California Natural Death Act-the first stat-
ute to recognize the legitimacy of private medical directives. It has
been estimated that over five million Living Wills have been dis-
tributed.48 Increasing numbers of jurisdictions are recognizing the
Living Will's apparent utility.4 9 To date only twenty-two jurisdic-
tions have made it legally enforceable.5 0 In other states, moreover,
courts have recognized such a document as relevant evidence in
civil suits where the withdrawal of life-support apparatus is
sought.5 '
Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of legislative au-
thorization to discontinue treatment of the terminal patient, the physician
and parents should be the primary decisionmakers.
48. Doctors Debate Right to Stop "Heroic" Effort to Keep Elderly Alive, Wall St.
J., Sept. 7, 1982, at 1, 20, col. 1.
49. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980). In
Severns the husband of a comatose patient filed a complaint in the Delaware
Court of Chancery seeking appointment as the patient's guardian and an or-
der authorizing him to request removal of her life-support systems. The Del-
aware Court of Chancery certified several questions to the supreme court.
The supreme court accepted certification as to one question only: Was the
Delaware Court of Chancery, absent enabling legislation, without power to
award the relief sought? Id. at 1339. The supreme court found that the lower
court would have power to authorize removal of the life-supports if the evi-
dence warranted it. Accordingly, the Wcourt instructed the lower court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing rather than rely solely on the stipulated facts
before it. The stipulation stated that the patient was an active member of the
Euthanasia Council of Delaware, id. at 1338 n.2, that she wanted to execute a
Living Will, id., and that she had made statements to third parties indicating
"her desire for discontinuance of life-sustaining procedures in the event of
her suffering an incapacitating injury or illness." Id. at 1340. The supreme
court implied that such evidence was relevant and should be brought out dur-
ing the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1349-50.
See also Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (where comatose patient previously executed a Living Will, a
duly appointed guardian may petition for authority to request removal of arti-
ficial life-support).
50. Alabama (May 27, 1981), Arkansas (Mar. 30, 1977), California (Sept. 30, 1976),
Delaware (July 12, 1982), District of Columbia (Feb. 25, 1982), Florida (Oct. 1,
1984), Georgia (July 1, 1984), Idaho (Mar. 1, 1977), Illinois (Jan. 1, 1984), Kan-
sas (July 1, 1979), Mississippi (July 1, 1984), Nevada (May 6, 1977), New Mex-
ico (April 7, 1977), North Carolina (July 1, 1977), Oregon (June 9, 1977), Texas
(Aug. 29, 1977), Vermont (Apr. 8, 1982), Virginia (July 1, 1983), Washington
(June 7, 1979), West Virginia (June 4, 1984), Wisconsin (Oct. 1, 1984), and Wy-
oming (July 1, 1984).
51. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981). Storar was a consolidated case. The second suit, Eichner v.
Dillon, involved an 83-year-old man who went into cardiac arrest during a
routine hernia operation. As a result, he suffered brain damage and was
placed on a respirator. After being informed that there was no reasonable
chance for recovery, the patient's guardian filed suit requesting that the res-
pirator be removed. In support of his petition, the guardian submitted evi-
dence revealing that before the operation the patient had "made it known
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In March 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Re-
search reported great variety among the fifteen Living Will stat-
utes currently in force.5 2 The most common provisions of these
statutes, including those that restrict the efficacy of the Living Will,
will now be explored. Of course, problems encountered in these
twenty-two jurisdictions are compounded when no enabling legis-
lation exists.
A. Procedural Requirements
All statutory provisions establishing the use of Living Wills
adopt the same procedural requirements as those found in testa-
mentary will provisions.53 These procedural safeguards put a de-
clarant on notice that an important document is being executed.
While most of the twenty-two states which have adopted the Liv-
ing Will have provided a statutory Living Will form to be used by
prospective testators,5 4 a failure to properly execute the document
may still lead to the will's invalidation. However, the fear that
such formalities may limit the number of valid instruments cata-
lyzed the need for further protection through a savings clause
which guarantees common law rights in the absence of a valid
declaration.5 5
The practice of cautioning a declarant to consider carefully the
importance and content of the document has been extended be-
yond formalities of execution. The California, Texas, Idaho, and
Oregon statutes also require the patient to revalidate his directive
that under these circumstances [i.e., a vegetative coma] he would want a res-
pirator removed." Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270-71. New
York had not enacted legislation making the Living Will legally enforceable.
The court, however, went so far as to recognize the oral Living Will as evi-
dence of the patient's desires, and approved discontinuance of the respirator.
52. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 141.
53. For example, Arkansas' statute provides that "[any person, with the same
formalities as are required by the laws of this State for the execution of a will,
may execute a document." Am. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (Supp. 1983).
California, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Washington also require
that the will "be signed by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not
related to the declarant by blood or marriage and who would not be entitled
to any portion of the estate of the declarant." See, e.g., CAT HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1983). California also prohibits a treating physician
or healthcare facility from being a witness. Further safeguards for the pa-
tient in a nursing home are assured by the requirement that one witness
must be a patient advocate, so named by the State Department of Aging for
that specific purpose. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188.5 (West Supp.
1983).
54. Arkansas, Delaware, and New Mexico do not provide a form.
55. CALi HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (West Supp. 1983).
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after becoming terminally il.56 California adds the requirement
that a patient must wait fourteen days after his terminal illness is
diagnosed before revalidating his wishes. The revalidation re-
quirement appears to be an Achilles heel to those Living Will stat-
utes which contain them. Much of the time such provisions are
unrealistic and unworkable. A recent survey conducted by Stan-
ford University revealed that only half of California's patients who
drafted directives before becoming terminally ill remained con-
scious for the required waiting period. The other half were either
dead or legally incompetent before the fourteen day period had
expired.5 7
The Karen Ann Quinlan case5 8 offers an example of the
problems inherent in the revalidation requirement. In that case,
Karen's parents who sought to remove her from the respirator
would not have been aided by a Living Will executed in a state
which requires revalidation. Had she signed an otherwise enforce-
able document, Karen's physician would not have been able to de-
termine that Karen was terminally ill until she was actually
unconscious-at which time revalidation would be physically
impossible.
If Karen Quinlan had executed a Living Will in the majority of
states with enabling legislation, no revalidation nor waiting period
would be required.5 9 However, nearly all states place legislative
limitations on the conditions under which a directive may become
operative. Typical provisions specify that a physician must deter-
mine "that the declarant's present condition is terminal and incur-
able," 60 and that death is "imminent."61 Critical conditions-
where the possibility of death is a danger but not absolute-and
cronic vegetative states are not included. Arguably, at the time
Karen Quinlan's father sought permission to remove her from the
respirator, she had been diagnosed as terminal.6 2 In retrospect,
56. Only the District of Columbia requires the physician to inform the declarant
of his terminal condition, and then only if the patient is alert and communica-
tive. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2425(b) (Supp. 1983). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-
3803 (Supp. 1983) (requiring diagnosis of terminal illness for minors or
mental incompetents only). The remaining fourteen jurisdictions have no
physician notification requirement for patients, a factor which fundamentally
undermines the revalidation requirement found in the California statute and
those modeled after it.
57. Comment, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physi-
cians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REv. 913, 928 (1979). See also CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1983).
58. See supra note 47 (discussing the Quinlan case).
59. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3802 to -3804 (Supp. 1983).
60. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b) (1977).
61. VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:2 to .8:3 (1983).
62. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 28-31, 355 A.2d 647, 656-58, (stating that there was no
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her physicians were wrong; Karen continues to survive in a perma-
nent vegetative state. Interestingly, the presence of a valid Living
Will would still be of little use to Karen since she does not suffer
from a terminal illness, nor is she faced with "imminent" death.
These points are further illustrated by the facts of a recent
criminal case in California, Barber v. Superior Court.63 Clarence
Herbert, like Karen Quinlan, suffered apparently irreversible brain
damage due to a cardiorespiratory arrest following an otherwise
successful and routine surgery. After a short period of respiratory
treatment, he was removed from the respirator and continued to
breathe. Because of the overly restrictive revalidation require-
ment in the California statute, a Living Will would have been use-
less to Herbert, his family, and physicians. Such a will would
require a two week waiting period before becoming enforceable.
Herbert stopped breathing in the recovery room and never became
conscious from that moment until his death eleven days later.
Moreover, following removal of the respirator, Herbert's vegetative
state, like that of Karen Quinlan, did not qualify as a "terminal
condition."64 Until diagnosis of a terminal condition can be made,
all patient and family rights are determined solely by common
law.6 5 The appellate court, which exonerated Doctors Barber and
Nejdl on October 12, 1983, noted that Living Will provisions are "so
cumbersome that it is unlikely that any but a small number of
highly educated and motivated patients will be able to effectuate
their desires." 66 Even then such a patient's desire would be
honored only if the terminal illness does not result in unconscious-
ness before completion of the waiting period.
Although Clarence Herbert's actual expressed desire prior to
his surgery was not to "become another Karen Ann Quinlan,"67 ex-
isting Living Will legislation gives no legal credence to such ex-
pressions. Though common law remedies remain, they cannot
alleviate the emotional suffering and economic loss to the family
known treatment available for either curing or improving Karen's condition),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
63. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
64. Id. at -, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,492 (1983). Doctors Nedjl and Barber were unable
to diagnose the precise amount of brain damage suffered by Clarence Her-
bert. They determined that Herbert exhibited minimal brain activity and, as
such, could not be pronounced brain dead. Id. at -, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
Beyond this, however, Nedjl and Barber could conclude only that Herbert
had virtually no chance of recovering his cognitive functions. Id. at -, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 492.
65. See supra note 53.
66. Id. at -, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50-51, 355 A.2d
647, 669, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)).




that the Living Will acts were intended to prevent.6 8 In addition to
all of this, the medical staff remains exposed to the complex uncer-
tainties of both civil and criminal liability.6 9
B. Physician Immunity
In Barber, Doctors Barber and Nejdl relied, in part, on the writ-
ten informed consent of the family in discontinuing Mr. Herbert's
life-support.70 Had a Living Will been executed by Herbert, how
secure would the Doctors have been when life-sustaining equip-
ment was turned off? Ironically, in nearly all jurisdictions, Her-
bert's execution of a Living Will would have afforded less
protection to his physicians than that provided by common law
doctrines of informed consent and malpractice, which they argued
in defense against the charges of murder and conspiracy leveled
against them.
As is the case with the other Living Will statutes, 7 1 California's
Natural Death Act grants civil and criminal immunity to health
care personnel and institutions that act in good faith to remove or
withhold life-sustaining procedures when the patient suffers from
a terminal, incurable illness.7 2 Assuming Mr. Herbert's condition
could be defined as "terminal," the meaning of the phrase "life-
sustaining procedures," 73 is still not clear. Although a respirator
probably qualifies as a life-sustaining procedure, the Act's defini-
tion does not state whether feeding tubes of various descriptions,
blood transfusions, or even arterial blood gas studies also fall
within its ambit.74 Judicial clarification of such as issue would
68. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
70. 137 Cal. App. 3d at -, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489. The physicians argued that they
consistently acted with the informed consent of the family. In August 1981,
Clarence Herbert successfully underwent an ileostomy. While in the recov-
ery room, he suffered cardiorespiratory arrest. He was treated and attached
to a respirator. Subsequent neurological tests revealed that Herbert was co-
matose with little chance of recovery. He had suffered severe brain damage
and was likely to remain in a permanent vegetative state. Physicians commu-
nicated the prognosis to the Herbert family who met and drafted a memoran-
dum requesting that "all machines [be] taken off that are sustaining life." Id.
at -, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. The memo was signed by Herbert's wife and eight
children. Upon removal of the respirator, Herbert continued to breathe. Act-
ing in accordance with their own professional judgment and without written
consent of the family, Herbert's physicians ordered removal of all intrave-
nous fluid and nourishment tubes. Herbert received only nursing care until
his death eleven days after surgery.
71. See supra note 50.
72. CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1983).
73. Id. § 7187(c).
74. California's Natural Death Act defines "life-sustaining procedure" as "medi-
cal or other artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a vital function"
[Vol. 63:779
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
probably require costly guardianship or conservatorship
proceedings.7 5
Necessarily then, courts and medical decisionmakers remain
subject to common law notions of propriety; hence, Doctors Nejdl
and Barber could well remain vulnerable to legal attack for their
behavior during the entire course of medical treatment despite the
presence of a valid Living Will. Thus, if Clarence Herbert's hypo-
thetical Living Will was construed to include termination of a res-
pirator, but not feeding tubes, the common law doctrine of
informed consent would govern the latter issue. The requirements
of material disclosure and clear consent, and the determination of
whether the relatives acted in the best interests of the patient
would determine the sufficiency of the physicians' communica-
tions with Herbert's relatives.7 6 Similarly, criminal law concepts
such as "malice," "intent" or "unlawful" behavior would govern a
murder indictment.77 However, physicians relying on a document
may forget these obligations. Consequently, a validly executed
Living Will could mislead a physician when it is, in fact, legally
inoperative and provides no immunity in a medical situation.
Given the limited scope and concomitant immunity under the
Act, physicians have little motivation to follow the dictates of a Liv-
ing Will. This article is reinforced by additional provisions that
give the physician who fails to comply with an advance directive
both criminal and civil immunity.7 8 Only Vermont and Wyoming
which prolongs the "moment of death" and does not change the prognosis.
Id.
75. See supra note 35. California requires conservatorship, CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 2300 (West 1981), unless there is no ongoing need for a conservator, in
which case a single court hearing can be held. Id& § 3200. Though simplified,
this procedure requires the determinations of which person will make the
medical decision and authorization of the medical treatment recommended.
76. California has led the way in articulating these elements. See, e.g., Truman v.
Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980); Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229, 505 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
77. When forced to categorize intravenous feeding tubes and respirators in a
murder-conspiracy case, the appellate court in Barber relied on a benefit-bur-
den analysis derived from civil cases and the writings of ethicists. 137 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, -, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484. 490-92 (1983). The court found a murder
prosecution to be "a poor way to design an ethical and moral code for doc-
tors," id. at -, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486, and requested legislative clarification in
distinguishing between "lawful" and "unlawful" withholding of treatment.
Reversing the lower court's ruling that any intentional conduct which short-
ened the patient's life was unlawful, the appellate court said such conduct
was not unlawful if the physicians' acts were consistent with accepted medi-
cal practice in the community in which physicians practice. Id. at -, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 492.
78. California law provides: "No physician... shall be criminally or civilly liable
for failure to effectuate the directive of the qualified patient .... ." CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1983).
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require the physician to transfer the patient to another physician's
care or, in the alternative, to inform the patient or his family of his
inability to follow the directives.7 9 The other states generally fol-
low the Virginia provision: "An attending physician who refuses to
comply with the declaration of a qualified patient... shall make a
reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another physician."80
The physician's refusal to withhold treatment or transfer the pa-
tient brings no statutory penalty in most jurisdictions and the pos-
sibility of professional censure in only a few.81
C. Summary
Current Living Will legislation attempts to facilitate an individ-
ual's use of advance directives in medical decisionmaking. How-
ever, in most cases the legislation actually impairs the use of
advance directives. Although procedural prerequisites and
revalidation requirements exist for the declarant's protection, they
also drastically limit the scope of the patient's decisionmaking au-
thority. Similarly, immunity provisions for health care personnel
raise difficult questions. The physician immunity issue is a partic-
ularly serious one, because it operates as a two-edged sword.
Broad immunity is necessary to preserve responsible medical
practice. However, because the medical decisionmaker is under
no threat of penalty if the Living Will is disregarded, and is given
scant protection if it is followed, he has gained little incentive to
follow the patient's wishes, and even greater control over sobering
life and death issues.
Despite problems with their use, Living Wills perform a valua-
ble function: They allow a person to express a desire to die with-
out unnecessary medical intervention. Because it may be difficult
to talk about these matters with family or physicians, a simple doc-
ument allows for expression of the patient's deeply held beliefs.
When the patient is no longer able to communicate, such a docu-
ment may be the only vestige of autonomous intent.
79. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5256 (1982); WYO STAT. § 33-26-147(b) (1984).
80. VA. CODE § 54-325.8:7 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added).
81. One commentator argues that courts have generally denied civil immunity
unless the legislation or case law clearly requires it. Freamon, Death With
Dignity Laws: A Plea For Uniform Legislation, 5 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 105,
136 (1982). Living Will statutes retain the physician's liability for negligence
or failure to act on the informed consent of patient or family. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (West Supp. 1983).
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III. THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY AND MEDICAL
DECISIONMAKING
A. Generally
Morally, medical decisionmaking for the terminally ill should
remain with the patient.82 Nevertheless, a legal gap between life
and death remains. Although a dying patient may attempt to dig-
nify the final stages of life by expressing his desires in a Living
Will, existing legislation does not guarantee that the patient's val-
ues will control.
In Barber v. Superior Court,83 California's Second District
Court of Appeals echoed the need expressed by other courts84 for
legislation to guide health care decisionmaking so that guardians,
relatives, hospital ethics committees, and courts would no longer
be required to substitute their values for those of the patient.85
The California legislature had, in fact, been hard at work while
Barber was pending. On September 29, 1983, two weeks prior to
the Barber decision, it passed the Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Act.86 Known as S.B. 762, the Act was drafted by the
California Law Revision Commission, following passage of the 1981
Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, in order to make clear
that health care decisions are covered in the general durable
power authority.87 Introduced by Senator Barry Keene on March
2, 1983, S.B. 762 passed both houses of the California legislature
within six months, and became law without the Governor's signa-
ture on September 29, 1983. The Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Decisions Act became operative on January 1, 1984.
The durable power concept originated in the common law prin-
cipal-agent context and traditionally has been used for business,
property, or investment purposes. It is intended to transfer man-
82. Barber v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, -, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491
(1983).
83. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
84. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d 417 (1977);In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Leach v. Akron
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); In re Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
85. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1006, -, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983).
86. Uniform Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Decisions Act, ch. 1204,
1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6907 (West) [hereinafter cited as Durable Power Health
Care Act].
87. The 1981 Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act does not specify whether
health care decisions are included in the general durable power authority.
See CAT. CIV. CODE §§ 2410-2423 (West Supp. 1983).
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agement of one's property to another without the necessity of
court supervision.88 Consequently, personal rights, such as mar-
rying, voting or the drafting of a will, cannot be transferred to an
attorney-in-fact. 89
In some states, court supervision of a guardian is not enough to
allow one to exercise such private rights.90 If these personal rights
are lost due to incompetency, then arguably, medical care deci-
sions based directly on the right to privacy should also be deemed
non-transferable. Recognizing that health care decisions cannot
be ignored, however, courts have often extended the guardian's
power to include health care decisionmaking on behalf of the in-
competent person.9 1
It is questionable whether the durable power concept should
transfer such authority in the absence of court supervision. On the
one hand, many, including the President's Commission, have rec-
ognized the need for a relatively simple procedure to transfer med-
ical decisionmaking authority. The durable power concept seems
adaptable to such a use.92 On the other hand, the lack of historical
basis for such an adaptation, combined with the need to clarify is-
sues which occur primarily in the context of health care decision-
making has led the commission's chairman, Alexander Capron, to
recommend "supplement [ing] the existing statutes with specific
provisions . . . covering . . . the patient's understanding of the
range of choices the surrogate might need to make about medical
treatment [and] means of resolving any disputes that arise be-
tween surrogate and caretakers." 93 Capron's remarks about the
utility of current legislation remain hypothetical, since state courts
have yet to rule on the extension of a general durable power to
health care situations.
88. Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L
REV. 985, 1013-14 (1984).
89. Id. at 1009.
90. See In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273
(1981) (citing In re Barletta, 2 Misc. 2d 135, 139, 150 N.Y.S.2d 479, 483-84 (1956);
In re Rasmussen, 147 Misc. 564, 566, 264 N.Y.S. 231 (1933); Mainzer v. Avril, 108
Misc. 230, 232, 177 N.Y.S. 596 (1919)).
91. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 378, 420 N.E.2d 64, 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 273
(1981).
92. Alexander M. Capron, Chairman of the President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
commented on the possible use of existing durable power legislation for
healthcare decisionmaking. He stated that "many legal mechanisms have
been found to have broader uses over time than when they were first cre-
ated." Letter from Alexander M. Capron, Chairman, President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behav-




Specific enabling legislation is not only feasible but also extant
at the state level. California leads the way and, with time, will un-
doubtedly face legal challenges to its Natural Death Act and Dura-
ble Power of Attorney for Health Care Decisions Act. The Living
Will might also be a valuable adjunct to the durable power for
health care, despite flaws and complex language which might
threaten its utility.94 In the event that a probate court is asked to
determine whether the attorney-in-fact acted in accordance with
the desires or best interests of the principal, a Living Will could
provide a more complete expression of the principal's desires.95
Legislating the Living Will enables the patient to express his
personal desires regarding the administration or withdrawal of
life-support procedures. Enactment of a durable power of attorney
for health care decisions gives the patient an expanded opportu-
nity to articulate these desires and, in addition, to designate the
person to whom such decisionmaking authority should be trans-
ferred.96 Because the patient controls the language appearing in
the document, medical decisionmaking should be far less suscepti-
ble to the vagaries of statutory interpretation. 97 Of course, the in-
ability to foresee precise circumstances remains a problem only
partially resolved by the current legislative models.
B. Key Provisions of the California Act
Under the California Durable Power of Attorney for Health
Care Decisions Act, in order to appoint an attorney-in-fact for med-
ical decisionmaking, the patient (or principal) must specify that
his trusted relative, friend, or other surrogate is empowered to
make health care decisions on his behalf. The attorney-in-fact
must be a California citizen who, under this specified designation
of authority, may not combine medical decisionmaking with other
authority granted him by a general durable power of attorney.98
94. See supra notes 47-81 and accompanying text.
95. This is particularly true in states where one may execute a Living Will to suit
his specific needs. See, e.g., ARk. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (Supp. 1983).
96. PRESIDENT'S CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 1, at 146.
97. See Durable Power Health Care Act, supra note 86, § 2433 (a) (1). This section
provides:
This document gives the person you designate as your attorney in
fact the power to make health care decisions for you, subject to any
limitations or statement of your desires that you include in this docu-
ment. The power to make health care decisions for you may include
consent, refusal of consent, or withdrawal of consent to any care,
treatment, service, procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat a physi-
cal or mental condition. You may state in this document any types of
treatment or placements that you do not desire.
Id.
98. Id. § 2410(c).
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Restrictions on who may serve as agent protect the principal from
conflicts of interest. An attorney-in-fact may not be the principal's
treating health care provider or one of its employees, nor may he
be the operator or employee of a community care facility. The
agent's decisionmaking power is limited only by the principal's
own ability to give informed consent.9 9
A valid document must follow one of two prescribed methods of
execution: (1) at least two "qualified" witnesses'0 0 must attest to
the principal's signature or must acknowledge his signature; or (2)
the document must be acknowledged by the principal before a no-
tary of public in California. If the patient is confined to a commu-
nity care facility, the Act requires one witness to be a patient
advocate or an ombudsman so designated by the State Depart-
ment of Aging for that purpose.101 The caveat "Warning to [the]
Person Executing This Document" must appear in ten point bold-
face type if the document is printed, or all capital letters if it is
typed. This serves to further alert the principal to the significance
of the document he has created. 0 2 Alternatively, the drafting at-
torney may sign a statement certifying that he has informed his
client of the legal consequences of signing the document.103 These
provisions have been incorporated into a statutory form that be-
comes effective Jan. 1, 1985.104
Finally, the durable power of attorney is invalid if it has been
allowed to expire. Section 2436.5 states that it expires seven years
after the date of execution, unless the principal lacks the capacity
to make health care decisions for himself, in which case the docu-
ment remains valid until the principal regains the capacity to make
health care decisions. Of course, the principal retains power to re-
voke the document at any time prior to the statutory limit. His
99. Id. §§ 2432(b), 2434(a).
100. Id. § 2432(a), (d). These provisions state that the following may not serve as
witnesses: (1) health care providers or employees of health care providers;
(2) attorneys-in-fact; and (3) operators or employees of community care facil-
ities. Additionally, § 2432(e) (1)-(2) requires that at least one witness must be
either unrelated to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, or unnamed
as a beneficiary under the principal's will at the time of execution of the dura-
ble power.
101. Id. § 2432(f).
102. Id. § 2433(a).
103. Id. § 2433(c) (2). This provision is consistent with the requirements of good
legal practice. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4 (1983). See
also Martyn, Informed Consent In The Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 307 (1980).
104. Keene Health Care Agent Act, S.B. 1365, ch. 602 (to be codified at CAL Crv.
CODE § 2500 (1984)), authorizes use of a particular form in the creation of a




competence to revoke is presumed.105 This power of revocation ex-
tends both to the removal of the attorney-in-fact (either orally or
by writing) and to his authority for health care decisionmaking,
through notification of the health care provider.106 Once notified,
the provider must add the revocation to the patient's medical
records and must make a reasonable effort to notify the attorney-
in-fact.107 Unless otherwise stated, a valid durable power of attor-
ney for health care revokes any prior version.1 08
C. Legal Effects of the California Act
Under the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Deci-
sions Act, the attorney-in-fact exercises broad health care deci-
sionmaking power encompassing both the administration and
termination of medical treatment for the unconscious patient. Un-
like a Living Will that is catalyzed by a diagnosis of terminal ill-
ness and imminent death,109 the agent appointed under this Act
may give "consent, refusal of consent, or withdrawal of consent to
health care,"" 0 which includes "any care, treatment, service, or
procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical
or mental condition."' For example, the attorney-in-fact may
make a disposition under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, receive
information regarding proposed treatment, and review and release
information found in medical records."12 In short, any decision-
making power that the principal himself might have exerted, in-
cluding the power to demand the termination of life-supports, is
within the purview of the attorney-in-fact's authority, absent an
expression of contrary intent by the principal. Despite this broad
grant of power, the statute places certain absolute limitations on
the agent's decisionmaking authority. The attorney-in-fact may
not commit the principal to a mental institution, and may not au-
thorize psychosurgery, electroconvulsive treatment, sterilization,
or abortion."13
D. The Limits of Health Care Decisionmaking Power
Under the California Statute, the attorney-in-fact is prohibited
from exercising his statutory authority: (1) after expiration of the
105. Durable Power Health Care Act, supra note 86, § 2437(c).
106. Id. § 2437(a) (1)-(2).
107. Id. § 2437(b).
108. Id. § 2437(d).
109. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
110. Id. § 2430(c).
111. Id. § 2430(b).
112. Id. §§ 2434(b)-(c), 2436.
113. Id. § 2435(a)-(e).
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
seven-year statute of limitations;114 (2) to revoke the agent's au-
thority;15 (3) where he lacks the capacity to give informed consent
on the part of the principal;116 (4) in dereliction of his duty to act
consistent with the principal's expressed desires;117 or (5) in a
manner clearly contrary to the principal's best interests, if his
desires are unknown."l8 Section 2411 sets up elaborate procedures
whereby interested parties (including both principal and agent)
can petition the probate court for determination of these issues.
Nowhere does the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
Decisions Act define the best interests of the principal. The com-
mon law standard of "best interests," which relies heavily on prior
expressed intentions, was recommended for use in durable power
statutes by the President's Commission.119 Under the common
law "best interests" standard, the principal may choose to commu-
nicate his express desires privately to his chosen surrogate or
more formally through a Living Will or express language in the du-
rable power of attorney document. The attorney-in-fact would
then have a duty to act in accordance with the principal's wishes,
as expressed in the Durable Power of Attorney, Living Will, or
otherwise. If the principal's wishes are not known, the agent must
act in the best interests of the principal, with knowledge that his
decision, whether to act by affirmation or omission, will be subject
to the scrutiny of the probate court through the petition process
initiated by interested parties who challenge the attorney-in-fact's
interpretation of the best interests of the principal.120 Emergency
114. Id. § 2436.5.
115. Id. § 2437(a) (2).
116. Id. § 2437(a).
117. Id. § 2412(d) (3).
118. Id. § 2412.5(b).
119. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 134-36. In re Phillip B., 92
Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980), in-
volved a 12-year-old boy who suffered from Down's Syndrome. In 1973, physi-
cians discovered a congenital heart defect and recommended that the boy
undergo surgery. The patient's parents refused to consent to the operation.
The juvenile probation department thereafter filed a petition requesting that
the child be declared a dependent of the court for the purpose of ensuring
that he receive cardiac surgery. In determining whether or not to order medi-
cal treatment, which was rejected by the parents, the court found it necessary
to weigh several factors. Noting that the "underlying consideration is the
child's welfare and whether his best interests will be served by the medical
treatment," id. at 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 51, the court stated that the following
must be taken into consideration: (1) the seriousness of the harm the child is
suffering or the substantial likelihood that he will suffer serious harm; (2) the
evaluation for the treatment by the medical profession; (3) the risks involved
in medically treating the child; and (4) the expressed preferences of the
child. Id.
120. Durable Power Health Care Act, supra note 86, § 2412.5. This procedure is a
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treatment, however, may be provided without the attorney-in-
fact's authorization if unavailable because of time restraints.
The physician immunity provision of the Durable Power of At-
torney for Health Care Decisions Act is a source of added concern.
Section 2438 states that there shall be immunity from civil and
criminal liability as well as from professional censure for health
care providers who act on the basis of a good faith belief that the
attorney-in-fact is authorized by the statute to make a health care
decision. The Act imposes additional duties on the health care
provider: (1) the provider must believe, in good faith, that the de-
cision is not inconsistent with the principal's wishes; and, (2) if the
decision is to withhold or withdraw health care necessary to keep
the principal alive, the provider must make a "good faith" effort to
determine the desires of the principal (to the extent that the prin-
cipal is able to convey those desires to the health care provider)
and log those desires in the principal's medical records.121
Despite frequent statutory references to "good faith," health
care provider immunity appears to be based on a higher standard.
Good faith efforts, as previously discussed, are valid only if the
health care provider relies on a health care decision made by the
attorney-in-fact pursuant to the statute.122 In other words, the
physician is granted immunity only if he agrees to subordinate his
own judgment to that of the surrogate decisionmaker.
Like the Natural Death Act, the Durable Power of Attorney for
Health Care Decisons Act's immunity provision frees health care
providers from the vague restrictions of civil, criminal, and profes-
sional sanctions. Unlike similar Living Will immunity provisions,
however, the scope of immunity is not limited to terminal illness
and imminent death. As long as the decisionmaker acts within the
scope of delegated authority, the number of occasions and kinds of
decisions that can be ruled on are unlimited.
Extended immunity solves the twofold problem of Living Will
immunity provisions. Extending the scope of physician immunity
gives health care personnel more incentive to discuss and listen to
patient and surrogate decisionmakers. Patient autonomy is also
reinforced by allowing principals to delegate decisionmaking to
the entire range of decisions while incompetent. Thus, patient and
physician are encouraged to act in tandem, rather than concerning
themselves with conflicting personal or legal obligations. The Du-
rable Power of Attorney Act resolves legal conflicts by clarifying
streamlined version of a conservatorship proceeding, which would be used
with or without a Living Will. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
121. Durable Power Health Care Act, supra note 86, § 2438(a) (1)-(2).
122. Id. § 2438(a) (1).
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and focusing on the primary moral right-personal autonomy in
decisionmaking.
E. Summary
Although Delaware,123 Pennsylvania, 2 4 Virginia and Wyo-
ming125 have also enacted specific legislation addressing the issue
of proxy health care decisionmaking on behalf of the incompetent
terminal patient, their statutes do not begin to approach the com-
prehensiveness of the California statutes. Courts have not yet
ruled on the right of a principal to delegate health care decision-
making by use of the general durable power of attorney acts now
existing in forty-nine states.126 The California legislature's fore-
sight and concern for the human, medical, and economic realities
of an aging population is to be admired. It may be some time
before the new durable power for health care statute is judicially
tested. In the meantime, the need to protect self-determination has
resurfaced in California with the 1983 Durable Power of Attorney
for Health Care Decisions Act.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Both Living Will and durable power of attorney legislation have
strengths and weaknesses. Neither provides facile answers to the
difficult dilemma faced by the competent adult seeking to ensure
some measure of control over the increasingly dehumanizing pro-
cess of dying. Both options, however, could create a synergistic
effect which neither completely achieves alone.
Recourse to common law and constitutional rights is no longer
123. Delaware's general durable power provisions appear in the state's probate
code under fiduciary relationships. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4901-4905
(Supp. 1982). Its proxy health care authorization appears elsewhere, how-
ever. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(b) (1983) ("An adult person by writ-
ten declaration may appoint an agent who will act on behalf of such
appointer, if, due to a condition resulting from illness or injury and, in the
judgment of the attending physician, the appointer becomes incapable of
making a decision in the exercise of the right to accept or refuse medical
treatment.").
124. Pennsylvania authorizes an attorney-in-fact to admit the principal to a medi-
cal facility, to initiate medical treatment, and to render medical and surgical
procedures. 20 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5603(h) (1)-(2) (Purdon Supp. 1983-
1984). These powers are included in the chapter on general durable powers
of attorney.
125. Virginia's and Wyoming's Natural Death Acts include proxy authorization for
medical decisionmaking by a patient who later is diagnosed to be suffering
from a terminal condition. VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6(2) (Supp. 1983); Wyo. STATE.
§ 33-26-145 (1984). See also Novak and Luce, The Virginia Natural Death Act:
An Analysis, 32 VA. B. NEWS 21 (1983).
126. See supra note 41.
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a practicable alternative. Legislation, while clearly able to reflect
some public values, necessarily runs the risk of too tightly con-
straining moral or medical judgment. A harmonious pattern of
communication and cooperation among the patient, his caring fam-
fly, and trained empathetic health care professionals must be en-
couraged in medical decisionmaking for the critically ill.
The exploding technology of medicine and the escalation of
costs, both for terminal medical care and for the legal procedures
required to appoint a proxy decisionmaker if one does not exist,
make legislative enactment imperative. When a patient's only con-
nection to life is through a respirator or intravenous tube, the
length of his life should not be determined by the amount or dura-
tion of Medicare benefits.127
We all deserve to face the inevitable finality of life with strength
and dignity. Legislating advance directives for the terminally ill
may motivate the physician, patient, and other interested parties
to better communicate in a common quest for control over our ulti-
mate demise.
127. New federal regulations establish diagnosis-related groups which determine,
in advance of hospitalization, what reimbursement costs will be covered by
Medicare. See 42 C.F.R. § 405 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 234 (1984); 49 Fed. Reg. 27422
(1984). Though it is hoped this system gives hospitals a financial incentive to
control costs, it may also pressure hospitals to curtail certain expensive pro-
cedures or treatments. See Wasserman, The Doctor, the Patient and the




STATUTORY FORM DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE
(California Civil Code Section 2500)
WARNING TO PERSON EXECUTING THIS DOCUMENT
THIS IS AN IMPORTANT LEGAL DOCUMENT WHICH IS AUTHORIZED BY
THE KEENE HEALTH CARE AGENT ACT. BEFORE EXECUTING THIS DOCU-
MENT, YOU SHOULD KNOW THESE IMPORTANT FACTS:
THIS DOCUMENT GIVES THE PERSON YOU DESIGNATE AS YOUR
AGENT (THE ATrORNEY-IN-FACT) THE POWER TO MAKE HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS FOR YOU. YOUR AGENT MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH
YOUR DESIRES AS STATED IN THIS DOCUMENT OR OTHERWISE MADE
KNOWN.
EXCEPT AS YOU OTHERWISE SPECIFY IN THIS DOCUMENT, THIS DOC-
UMENT GIVES YOUR AGENT THE POWER TO CONSENT TO YOUR DOCTOR
NOT GIVING TREATMENT OR STOPPING TREATMENT NECESSARY TO
KEEP YOU ALIVE.
NOTWITHSTANDING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE
MEDICAL AND OTHER HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR YOURSELF SO
LONG AS YOU CAN GIVE INFORMED CONSENT WITH RESPECT TO THE
PARTICULAR DECISION. IN ADDITION, NO TREATMENT MAY BE GIVEN TO
YOU OVER YOUR OBJECTION AT THE TIME, AND HEALTH CARE NECES-
SARY TO KEEP YOU ALIVE MAY NOT BE STOPPED OR WITHHELD IF YOU
OBJECT AT THE TIME.
THIS DOCUMENT GIVES YOUR AGENT AUTHORITY TO CONSENT, TO
REFUSE TO CONSENT, OR TO WITHDRAW CONSENT TO ANY CARE, TREAT-
MENT, SERVICE, OR PROCEDURE TO MAINTAIN, DIAGNOSE, OR TREAT A
PHYSICAL OR MENTAL CONDITION. THIS POWER IS SUBJECT TO ANY
STATEMENT OF YOUR DESIRES AND ANY LIMITATIONS THAT YOU IN-
CLUDE IN THIS DOCUMENT. YOU MAY STATE IN THIS DOCUMENT ANY
TYPES OF TREATMENT THAT YOU DO NOT DESIRE. IN ADDITION, A
COURT CAN TAKE AWAY THE POWER OF YOUR AGENT TO MAKE HEALTH
CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU IF YOUR AGENT (1) AUTHORIZES ANYTHING
THAT IS ILLEGAL, (2) ACTS CONTRARY TO YOUR KNOWN DESIRES, OR
(3) WHERE YOUR DESIRES ARE NOT KNOWN, DOES ANYTHING THAT IS
CLEARLY CONTRARY TO YOUR BEST INTERESTS.
UNLESS YOU SPECIFY A SHORTER PERIOD IN THIS DOCUMENT, THIS
POWER WILL EXIST FOR SEVEN YEARS FROM THE DATE YOU EXECUTE
THIS DOCUMENT AND, IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO MAKE HEALTH CARE DE-
CISIONS FOR YOURSELF AT THE TIME WHEN THIS SEVEN-YEAR PERIOD
ENDS, THIS POWER WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST UNTIL THE TIME WHEN
YOU BECOME ABLE TO MAKE HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR YOURSELF.
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF YOUR AGENT
BY NOTIFYING YOUR AGENT OR YOUR TREATING DOCTOR, HOSPITAL, OR
OTHER HEALTH CARE PROVIDER ORALLY OR IN WRITING OF THE
REVOCATION.
YOUR AGENT HAS THE RIGHT TO EXAMINE YOUR MEDICAL RECORDS
AND TO CONSENT TO THEIR DISCLOSURE UNLESS YOU LIM1T THIS RIGHT
IN THIS DOCUMENT.
UNLESS YOU OTHERWISE SPECIFY IN THIS DOCUMENT, THIS DOCU-
MENT GIVES YOUR AGENT THE POWER AFTER YOU DIE TO DONATE YOUR
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BODY OR PARTS THEREOF FOR TRANSPLANT OR THERAPEUTIC OR EDU-
CATIONAL OR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES.
THIS DOCUMENT REVOKES ANY PRIOR DURABLE POWER OF ATTOR-
NEY FOR HEALTH CARE.
YOU SHOULD CAREFULLY READ AND FOLLOW THE WITNESSING PRO-
CEDURE DESCRIBED AT THE END OF THIS FORM. THIS DOCUMENT WILL
NOT BE VALID UNLESS YOU COMPLY WITH THE WITNESSING
PROCEDURE.
IF THERE IS ANYTHING IN THIS DOCUMENT THAT YOU DO NOT UNDER-
STAND, YOU SHOULD ASK A LAWYER TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU.
YOUR AGENT MAY NEED THIS DOCUMENT IMMEDIATELY IN CASE OF
AN EMERGENCY THAT REQUIRES A DECISION CONCERNING YOUR
HEALTH CARE. EITHER KEEP THIS DOCUMENT WHERE IT IS VIMEDI-
ATELY AVAILABLE TO YOUR AGENT AND ALTERNATE AGENTS OR GIVE
EACH OF THEM AN EXECUTED COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT. YOU MAY
ALSO WANT TO GIVE YOUR DOCTOR AN EXECUTED COPY OF THIS
DOCUMENT.
DO NOT USE THIS FORM IF YOU ARE A CONSERVATEE UNDER THE
LANTERMAN-PETRIS-SHORT ACT AND YOU WANT TO APPOINT YOUR CON-
SERVATOR AS YOUR AGENT. YOU CAN DO THAT ONLY IF THE APPOINT-
MENT DOCUMENT INCLUDES A CERTIFICATE OF YOUR ATTORNEY.
1. DESIGNATION OF HEALTH CARE AGENT. I,
(Insert your name and address)
do hereby designate and appoint
(Insert name, address, and telephone number of one individual only as your agent to make health care deci-
sions for you. None of the following may be designated as agent. (1) your treating health care provider, (2) a
nonrelative employee of your treating health care provider, (3) an operator of a community care facility, or (4) a
nonrelative employee of an operator of a community care facility.)
as my attorney-in-fact (agent) to make health care decisions for me as authorized
in this document. For the purposes of this document, "health care decision" means
consent, refusal of consent, or withdrawal of consent to any care, treatment, service,
or procedure to maintain, diagnose, or treat an individual's physical or mental
condition.
2. CREATION OF DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH CARE.
By this document I intend to create a durable power of attorney for health care
under Sections 2430 to 2443, inclusive, of the California Civil Code. This power of
attorney is authorized by the Keene Health Care Agent Act and shall be construed
in accordance with the provisions of Sections 2500 to 2506, inclusive, of the Califor-
nia Civil Code. This power of attorney shall not be affected by my subsequent
incapacity.
3. GENERAL STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY GRANTED. Subject to any limi-
tations in this document, I hereby grant to my agent full power and authority to
make health care decisions for me to the same extent that I could make such deci-
sions for myself if I had the capacity to do so. In exercising this authority, my agent
shall make health care decisions that are consistent with my desires as stated in
this document or otherwise made known to my agent, including, but not limited to,
my desires concerning obtaining or refusing or withdrawing life-prolonging care,
treatment, services, and procedures.
(If you want to limit the authority of your agent to make health care decisions for
you, you can state the limitations in paragraph 4 ("Statement of Desires, Special
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Provisions, and Limitations") below. You can indicate your desires by including a
statement of your desires in the same paragraph.)
4 STATEMENT OF DESIRES, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, AND LIMITATIONS.
(Your agent must make health care decisions that are consistent with your known
desires. You can, but are not required to, state your desires in the space provided
below. You should consider whether you want to include a statement of your
desires concerning life-prolonging care, treatment, services, and procedures. You
can also include a statement of your desires concerning other matters relating to
your health care. You can also make your desires known to your agent by discuss-
ing your desires with your agent or by some other means. If there are any types of
treatment that you do not want to be used, you should state them in the space
below. If you want to limit in any other way the authority given your agent by this
document, you should state the limits in the space below. If you do not state any
limits, your agent will have broad powers to make health care decisions for you,
except to the extent that there are limits provided by law.)
In exercising the authority under this durable power of attorney for health care,
my agent shall act consistently with my desires as stated below and is subject to
the special provisions and limitations stated below:
(a) Statement of desires concerning life-prolonging care, treatment, services,
and procedures:
(b) Additional statement of desires, special provisions, and limitations:
(You may attach additional pages if you need more space to complete your state-
ment. If you attach additional pages, you must date and sign EACH of the addi-
tional pages at the same time you date and sign this document.)
5. INSPECTION AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION RELATING TO MY
PHYSICAL OR MENTAL HEALTH. Subject to any limitations in this document,
my agent has the power and authority to do all of the following-
(a) Request, review, and receive any information, verbal or written,
regarding my physical or mental health, including, but not limited to, med-
ical and hospital records.
(b) Execute on my behalf any releases or other documents that may
be required in order to obtain this information.
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(c) Consent to the disclosure of this information.
(If you want to limit the authority of your agent to receive and disclose information
relating to your health, you must state the limitations in paragraph 4 ("Statement of
Desires, Special Provisions, and Limitations") above.)
6. SIGNING DOCUMENTS, WAIVERS, AND RELEASES. Where necessary to
implement the health care decisions that my agent is authorized by this document
to make, my agent has the power and authority to execute on my behalf all of the
following
(a) Documents titled or purporting to be a "Refusal to Permit Treat-
ment" and "Leaving Hospital Against Medical Advice."
(b) Any necessary waiver or release from liability required by a hos-
pital or physician.
7. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT. Subject to any limitations in this doc-
ument, my agent has the power and authority to make a disposition of a part or
parts of my body under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (Chapter 3.5 (commencing
with Section 7150) of Part 1 of Division 7 of the Health and Safety Code).
(If you want to limit the authority of your agent to make a disposition under the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, you must state the limitations in paragraph 4 ("State-
ment of Desires, Special Provisions, and Limitations") above.)
8. DURATION.
(Unless you specify a shorter period in the space below, this power of attorney will exist for seven years from
the date you execute this document and, if you are unable to make health care decisions for yourself at the time
when this seven-year period ends, the power will continue to exist until the time when you become able to
make health care decisions for yourself.)
This durable power of attorney for health care expires on
(Fill in this space ONLY if you want the authority of your agent to end EARLIER than the seven-year period
described above.)
9. DESIGNATION OF ALTERNATE AGENTS.
(You are not required to designate any alternate agents but you may do so. Any alternate agent you designate
will be able to make the same health care decisions as the agent you designated in paragraph 1, above, in the
event that agent is unable or ineligible to act as your agent. Also, if the agent you designated in paragraph 1 is
your spouse, he or she becomes ineligible to act as your agent if your marriage is dissolved.)
If the person designated as my agent in paragraph 1 is not available or becomes
ineligible to act as my agent to make a health care decision for me, or loses the
mental capacity to make health care decisions for me, or if I revoke that person's
appointment or authority to act as my agent to make health care decisions for me,
then I designate and appoint the following persons to serve as my agent to make
health care decisions for me as authorized in this document, such persons to serve
in the order listed below:
A. First Alternate Agent
(Insert name, address, and telephone number of first alternate agent)
B. Second Alternate Agent
(Insert name, address, and telephone number of second alternate agent)
10. NOMINATION OF CONSERVATOR OF PERSON.
(A conservator of the person may be appointed for you if a court desires that one should be appointed. The
conservator is responsible foryour physical care, which under some circumstances includes making health care
decisions for you. You are not required to nominate a conservator but you may do so. The court will appoint
the person you nominate unless that would be contrary to your best interests. You may, but are not required
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to, nominate as your conservator the same person you named in paragraph I as your health care agent. You can
nominate an individual as your conservator by completing the space below.)
If a conservator of the person is to be appointed for me, I nominate the following
individual to serve as conservator of the person
(Insert name and address of person nominated as conservator of the person)
11. PRIOR DESIGNATIONS REVOKED. I revoke any prior durable power of
attorney for health care.
DATE AND SIGNATURE OF PRINCIPAL
(YOU MUST DATE AND SIGN THIS POWER OF A'ITORNEY)





(THIS POWER OF ATrORNEY WILL NOT BE VALID UNLESS IT IS SIGNED BY
TWO QUALIFIED WITNESSES WHO ARE PRESENT WHEN YOU SIGN OR AC-
KNOWLEDGE YOUR SIGNATURE. IF YOU HAVE ATTACHED ANY ADDI-
TIONAL PAGES TO THIS FORM, YOU MUST DATE AND SIGN EACH OF THE
ADDITIONAL PAGES AT THE SAME TIME YOU DATE AND SIGN THIS
POWER OF ATTORNEY.)
STATEMENT OF WITNESSES
(This document must be witnessed by two qualifled adult witnesses. None of the following may be used as a
witness: (1) a person you designate as your agent or alternate agent, (2) a health care provider, (3) an em-
ployee of a health care provider, (4) the operator of a community care facility, (5) an employee of an operator of
a community health care facility. At least one of the witnesses must make the additional declaration set out
following the place where the witnesses sign.)
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that the person
who signed or acknowledged this document is personally known to me (or proved
to me on the basis of convincing evidence) to be the principal, signed or acknowl-
edged this durable power of attorney in my presence, that the principal appears to
be of sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence, that I am not the
person appointed as attorney-in-fact by this document, and that I am not a health
care provider, an employee of a health care provider, the operator of a community










(AT LEAST ONE OF THE ABOVE WITNESSES MUST ALSO SIGN THE FOL-
LOWING DECLARATION.)
I further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that I am
not related to the principal by blood, marriage, or adoption, and, to the best of my
knowledge, I am not entitled to any part of the estate of the principal upon the
death of the principal under a will now existing or by operation of law.
Signature:
Signature:
STATEMENT OF PATIENT ADVOCATE OR OMBUDSMEN
(If you are a patient in a sldled nursing facility, one of the witnesses must be a patient advocate or
ombudsman. The following statement is required only if you are a patient in a skilled nursing facility-a health
care facility that provides the following basic services: skilled nursing care and supportive care to patients
whose primary need is for availability of skilled nursing care on an extended basis. The patient advocate or
ombudsman must sign both parts of the "Statement of Witnesses" above AND must also sign the following
statement.)
I further declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of California that I am
a patient advocate or ombudsman as designated by the State Department of Aging
and that I am serving as a witness as required by subdivision (f) of Section 2432 of
the Civil Code.
Signature:
